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ABSTRACT 
The Companies Act of 2013 went into effect in India on April 1, 2014 making it the first 
law in the world to mandate that companies commit a portion of their profits to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) initiatives. Companies that met certain thresholds of net worth, net profit, or 
sales were required to create CSR committees and spend 2% of their average net profits on 
socially responsible activities. The law specifies that these donations should be focused 
outwardly, to the benefit of society, and on local communities. It does not, however, provide any 
penalty to companies which do not meet their 2% mark, only requiring them to disclose the 
reasons for failing to comply. This provides a unique situation to study the effects of CSR when 
it is not strictly voluntary but is still subject to the expectations of the public and other firms. The 
analysis uses panel data from the ProwessIQ database on 39,736 Indian firms from 2010-2016, 
which allows for two years of data since the Companies Act went into effect. 
 This thesis analyzes three central questions about how firms have responded to the 
Companies Act. The first is the extent to which firms are adjusting the likelihood of reporting 
their CSR expenditures and the magnitude of these expenditures under this new directive. To 
better understand the impact of the Companies Act, firm motivations to comply are considered. 
Why do firms choose to comply with the Companies Act without any formal penalty for 
noncompliance? One explanation focuses on the theory that a firm’s CSR expenditure is 
influenced by the CSR expenditures of the firm’s peers. The second issue centers on the potential 
reshuffling of expenditures from other types of charitable donations the firms may have been 
making prior to the Companies Act to CSR categories that comply with the Act. These first two 
questions are addressed using a series of difference-in-difference regressions to estimate the 
impact after the law went into effect. The final issue addressed in this thesis looks at the effects 
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of CSR expenditures on a firm’s financial performance, measured by its Tobin’s q and Return on 
Assets (ROA). I examine whether the markets are rewarding a firm for spending on “mandatory” 
CSR or instead treating these expenditures as a cost that adversely affects its value or ROA. 
 The results indicate that the Companies Act has had a positive and statistically significant 
effect on the likelihood of reporting and magnitude of CSR expenditures. While the evidence 
suggests the Act encouraged firms to increase their CSR to some extent, it also shows a strong 
peer effect which influenced firms to increase their expenditures. However, there is no evidence 
that this increase in CSR expenditures came at the cost of non-CSR donations. Finally, the 
results show no relationship between CSR expenditures on a firm’s financial performance either 
before or after the Companies Act. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 At a time when companies are making more money for themselves and their shareholders 
than ever before, these companies are rightfully brought under the microscope to see how they, 
in turn, give back to their communities. This idea of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is 
not a new one, but yet has commanded a considerable multi-disciplinary literature to study the 
relationship between a company’s charitable giving and its financial performance. One of the 
goals of previous research has been to find a connection between CSR and financial 
performance. Such a relationship could begin to explain why firms engage in CSR at all; an 
activity which seems in contrast to Friedman’s (1970) argument that a firm’s sole responsibility 
is profit maximization. Through this theory CSR would be viewed as malpractice towards a 
firm’s shareholders. Evidence for an association between CSR and financial performance could 
be a driving force to increase firms’ CSR expenditures to the benefit of the firms and society in 
the long run. 
 In the decades that followed Friedman’s theories, researchers have provided 
counterarguments to explain why firms engage in CSR. These counterarguments are centered on 
the idea of “doing well by doing good.” One of the central tenants of this idea is Freeman’s 
(1984) theory, which argues that firms should consider the interests of all “stakeholders,” or 
everyone who is affected by the firm’s welfare. Similarly, the definition of CSR has evolved 
with the research. Dating back to the 1960s CSR was thought of as “decisions and actions taken 
for reasons at least partially beyond the firm's direct economic or technical interest.” (Davis 
1960). By the 1990s, others had incorporated Freeman’s stakeholder theory into the definition. 
Carroll (1991, 1999) refers to CSR as a company’s efforts to fulfill its economic, legal, ethical, 
and discretionary responsibilities that influence the quality of life of its stakeholders. Today CSR 
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is generally defined as a firm’s actions to improve its environmental and social performance 
beyond compliance or business as usual practices. 
The most straightforward theory for explaining why firms voluntarily engage in CSR is 
that they are likely to be rewarded through improved financial performance. McWilliams and 
Siegal (2001) demonstrated that consumers react to CSR and through CSR firms can improve 
their relationship with stakeholders. Risk-reduction also plays a large part of the decision to 
engage in CSR. CSR engagement has been found to inversely affect firm risk (Jo and Na, 2012). 
Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria (2004) also conclude “socially responsible companies tend to show 
less diversifiable risk in their stock behavior than non-socially responsible companies.” A third 
motivating factor towards CSR is the avoidance of government regulation. Lyon and Maxwell 
(2008) make their case that voluntary CSR investments may preempt regulations and political 
intervention. It is in the firms’ best interest to avoid the lobbying and high transaction costs that 
are associated with additional regulations. Nakao et al. (2007) contend that firms voluntarily 
engage in CSR to minimize regulatory compliance costs as well as the ability to control risks, 
lower operating costs, respond to stakeholders, gain market share, and improve competitive 
advantage. 
While these advantages are well documented in developed countries, a growing literature 
on the incentives for CSR in developing countries shows these effects may be lacking elsewhere. 
Regulations in developing countries may be weaker or non-existent (Blackman 2010). Mwaura 
(2004) finds that legal responsibilities, human rights, and other issues relevant to CSR have a 
lower priority in many African countries than in developed countries. Another cause for weaker 
incentives in developing countries is the lack of access to technology, which may limit the scope 
and increase the cost of CSR initiatives (Christmann and Taylor, 2001). Matten and Moon (2008) 
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also characterize developing countries as being subjected to weak institutions and poor 
governance. As further evidence for the difference between developed and developing countries, 
they explain that multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in developing countries have 
been increasing their CSR in response to the incentives present in developed countries. 
Nevertheless, consumers in developed countries have different priorities than those in developing 
countries and MNCs may not engage in local problems, but instead respond to the priorities of 
their consumers in developed countries. This provides further motivation for the Indian 
government to engage their companies in the effort to address local issues and the priorities of 
Indian consumers as well. 
Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) review several studies investigating the incentives for 
strategic CSR in developing countries and find “no evidence that consumer preferences in 
developed countries influence social performance by producers in developing countries.” 
Earnhart, Khanna, & Lyon (2006) also support this theory. Consumers in developing countries 
lacked the organization or willingness to pay higher prices for products produced by socially 
responsible firms. 
The Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the United Nations set forth a large 
agenda for social development for 2030. The government of India, in particular its Prime 
Minister and other senior Ministers are strongly committed to upholding this agenda (Sustainable 
Development Goals). To accomplish these goals the government sought to leverage the 
expansive technical resources and human capital of firms beyond purely financial support. 
Furthermore, the government hopes to develop a culture of social responsibility that goes beyond 
a company’s minimum obligations. The National Voluntary Guidelines on Social, Environmental 
and Economic Responsibilities of Businesses released by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs in 
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2011 laid the groundwork for what would later become law in the Companies Act of 2013. These 
Guidelines set forth nine principles for responsible business practices in India, almost half of 
which can be directly tied to CSR. 
 In an attempt to address the relatively low levels of CSR and to further a culture of social 
responsibility beyond mere guidelines, the Indian government passed the Companies Act on 
August 29, 2013. It became the first law in the world to mandate CSR with the purpose of 
engaging corporations to achieve the social development goals of the country. The Act requires 
that companies spend 2% of their average net profits of the three prior financial years on CSR 
activities if they meet one of three eligibility requirements. Companies that fail to spend 2% of 
their average net profits are required to disclose the reasons for not complying in their annual 
financial report but face no penalties for non-compliance. This Act provides a unique setting for 
research for two main reasons. First, it presents a natural experiment where firms have been 
assigned to engage in CSR as treatment and control groups. Second, it represents a hybridization 
of past research on the topic as CSR is not entirely voluntary, yet not formally penalized for non-
compliance. 
An initial analysis on the effectiveness of the Companies Act (Bansal, Khanna & Jain, 
2017) showed that, prior to the passage of the Companies Act, reporting and expenditures on 
CSR were below the rates that would be required for compliance. They reported that in 2014 
only 44.8% of firms that would have fallen under the purview of the Act were reporting CSR. 
That number fell to 10.4% when counting firms which were actually spending on CSR. 
The natural question to ask is why firms would choose to comply with the Act without 
any formal penalties especially as past literature has suggested there is no evidence for strategic 
CSR in developing countries. Since McWilliams and Siegal (2001) also theorized that firms 
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would engage in the profit maximizing level of CSR, when firms spend greater than that level 
they can expect only a “neutral return.” In that sense, the Companies’ Act mandate operates as a 
tax if it forces CSR beyond the voluntary level which would have prevailed otherwise. The Act 
uses companies’ fear of negative publicity as one way of motivating firms to comply as firms 
that do not comply must post their reasons for failing to do so on their website. 
Another motivation is that firms may be driven to increase their CSR expenditures due to 
peer pressure. This is especially true when the costs of complying with the Act are smaller than 
the public benefits of performing similar to their peers. An empirical analysis in China showed 
“that increased CSR performance levels among peer firms encourage firms to imitate their peers’ 
CSR behaviors; increased CSR pressure drives firms to raise their CSR performance level.” 
(Yang, Ye, and Zhu, 2017). Additionally, some industries have stronger effects on their peers’ 
CSR than other industries (Liu and Wu, 2016). Another factor that may play into these peer 
effects is geographic location. Jiraporn et al. (2014) also finds that “a firm is likely to take into 
account the level of CSR of surrounding firms when formulating its own CSR policy.” As a 
result, there is some uncertainty as to which firms a company may consider as its peers. 
The purpose of this research is to examine the effectiveness of the Companies Act on 
CSR outcomes including the reporting and level of CSR expenditures and the ratio of CSR 
expenditures to profits. Additionally, this paper attempts to determine the net effect of the 
Companies Act on overall charitable contributions. I set out to test whether firms are shifting 
spending from other social charitable donations to comply with the Companies Act. Building on 
existing literature, this paper will investigate the extent to which CSR is not only driven by the 
Companies Act but also through peer effects. Finally, this analysis will include a study on the 
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impact of CSR expenditures on different measures of financial performance and how that impact 
was affected by the implementation of the Companies Act. 
This analysis uses data from the ProwessIQ database consisting of 39,736 unique firms 
for the period of 2010-2016. There were three main approaches to carry out this research. First, a 
series of difference-in-difference regressions measure the differential effect of eligibility after the 
Act went into effect. This methodology is applied to a number of CSR outcome variables. The 
second approach also makes use of the difference-in-difference estimator, but also incorporates 
peer effects into the model. A firm’s peers are considered to be firms in the same industry. The 
final approach for this analysis focused on the impact of CSR on financial performance. These 
models use a lagged CSR variable to explain financial performance in the following year. 
 The results indicate that the Companies Act has had a positive and statistically significant 
effect on the likelihood and magnitude of CSR expenditures. However, when taking peer effects 
into account the findings show that firms may be more influenced by the CSR expenditures of 
their peers than they were by the Act itself. The evidence does not show any crowding out 
consequences of the Act on non-CSR donations. Finally, the results reveal no evidence of any 
relationship between CSR and financial performance before or after the Companies Act.  
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Due to the considerable volume of CSR literature, there have been several meta-analyses 
to describe overarching trends in the field. Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2009) look at 167 
studies comprising 192 relationships between CSR and financial performance. This meta-
analysis finds a modest positive average correlation with only 2% of studies reporting a negative 
connection. A number of methodological concerns are prevalent across these studies such as 
potential endogeneity, reverse causality or omitted variable problems. 
 The two main variables for measuring financial performance in this thesis are Tobin’s Q 
and ROA. The first, Tobin’s q, is a market-based measure of a firm’s financial performance. 
There are numerous studies which utilize this variable to study the relationship between CSR and 
financial performance including (Dowell et al., 2000; Guenster et al, 2011; Hagberg et al., 2015). 
Tobin’s q is especially relevant when analyzing CSR as a measure of whether strategic CSR is 
providing intrinsic value to the company which does not show up in its tangible assets. The 
second measure, ROA, is instead an accounting-based measure of firm performance. It is also 
widely used as a dependent variable when studying CSR (Tang et al., 2012; Hagberg et al., 
2015). The strategic benefits of CSR may be captured in a company’s profit, but not necessarily 
represented in its assets, making ROA another viable method of testing the relationship between 
CSR and financial performance. 
 Waddock and Graves (1997) provide one example of a positive empirical association 
between lagged CSR and financial performance as measured by ROA among other outcome 
variables. These findings were at odds with earlier research, which found no relationship 
between CSR and risk adjusted ROA (Aupperle et al. 1985). Waddock and Graves’ results also 
“indicate the importance of controlling for industry in the assessment of the relationship between 
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financial and CSP performance.” Their paper fails to account for the potential endogeneity of the 
CSR, but nevertheless provided a strong outline for future research. 
 Two decades later researchers showed the potential harms for not accounting for 
endogeneity in the relationship between CSR and financial performance. Results found in 
previous CSR research varied dramatically, even changing sign when endogeneity was properly 
considered (Garcia-Castro et al., 2009). This paper references Waddock and Graves (1997) as 
one of several studies where a weaker relationship between CSR and financial performance is 
found when accounting for endogeneity. Garcia-Castro et al. themselves find no evidence of a 
relationship between CSR and ROA, Tobin’s Q, or other financial outcomes using their 
instrumental variables. 
 An emerging literature explores the role of social norms or firms’ desire to conform to 
the behavior of peers in affecting firms’ behavior towards adopting socially responsible 
practices. These effects are found in a number of other corporate policies such as precautionary 
cash holdings (Hoberg and Phillips, 2014) and investment decisions (Foucault and Fresard, 
2014). There peer effects may translate beyond financial performance to social performance. One 
of the most recent studies by Cao, Liang, and Zhan (2018) makes a strong supporting argument, 
“it is reasonable to expect that CSR as an important corporate policy aimed at addressing various 
stakeholders’ issues that are often commonly shared by the local community, the industry, and 
even the country, should also be subject to peer effects.” While they were analyzing the effects 
of shareholder CSR proposals in the U.S., the authors found peers of a firm that narrowly passed 
a CSR proposal increased their CSR in the following year more than peers of a firm that 
narrowly rejected a CSR proposal. 
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 Two more CSR peer effect publications provide relevant procedures for this analysis. The 
first by Liu and Wu (2016) made use of a text-based definition of a firm’s peers and found that a 
firm is more likely to engage in CSR activities when that firm’s competitors engage in higher 
levels of CSR. They notably use firm, industry by year, and location by year fixed effects to 
minimize any endogeneity bias. Yang, Ye, and Zhu (2017) also find a positive effect of peer 
CSR on a firm’s CSR in Chinese companies from 2008 to 2015. Furthermore, firms with a gap 
between their CSR and their peers’ CSR face increased pressure from stakeholders and the 
public. The authors cite Leary and Roberts (2014) method of defining peers as all firms in the 
same industry except for the firm under investigation. My research expands on aspects from 
these papers to incorporate in my models. 
BACKGROUND ON THE COMPANIES ACT 
Section 135 of the Companies Act of 2013 states that: “Every company having net worth 
of rupees five hundred crore or more, or turnover [sales] of rupees one thousand crore or more or 
a net profit of rupees five crore or more during any financial year shall constitute a Corporate 
Social Responsibility Committee of the Board.” A crore is a unit of measure corresponding to 10 
million rupees (Rs.). Throughout this thesis firms are referred to as “eligible” if they meet the 
criteria set forth by the Companies Act in a given year. Therefore, the eligibility status of a firm 
can differ from year to year. This definition of eligibility is also applied retrospectively to firms 
before the Act went into effect and can be thought of as “potentially eligible” had the Act been in 
effect. 
In addition to mandating the creation of a CSR Committee, Section 135 also requires the 
formulation of a company CSR policy and that the company spend 2% of its average net profits 
of the three prior financial years on CSR activities. Companies that fail to spend 2% of their 
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average net profits are required to disclose the reasons for not complying in their annual financial 
report. The relevant sections of the Companies Act of 2013 went into effect on April 1, 2014 
requiring eligible firms to engage in and report CSR spending starting with the 2014-2015 
financial year. 
CSR activities can be classified as either focused inwardly to directly improving the 
social and environmental performance of a company or outwardly to benefit society. Some 
examples of inwardly beneficial CSR activities are investing resources towards reducing 
workplace accidents and risk, on the job training, energy conservation, or voluntary pollution 
reduction and waste management to reduce liability and risk. While a recent study suggests that 
internal CSR may have a positive impact on revenue as well (Cavazotte & Chang, 2016), the 
Companies Act of 2013 focuses on external CSR. Schedule VII of the Companies Act outlines 
various activities which companies may include in their CSR activities: fighting hunger, poverty 
or disease, promoting education, gender equality, or environmental sustainability, reducing child 
mortality, enhancing vocational skills, and contributing to social business projects or the Prime 
Minister’s National Relief Fund. Section 135 further stipulates that companies “shall give 
preference to the local area and areas around where it operates.” 
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 In the absence of the Companies Act firms are expected to engage in their optimal level 
of CSR for either strategic or altruistic reasons. The Act motivates firms to increase their CSR 
expenditures or to reshuffle their pre-existing donations to fall under the category of CSR. The 
extent of this motivation depends on a firm’s stakeholders and competition and therefore will 
vary across firms. The Act gives stakeholders more power to pressure their firms to engage in 
more CSR activities due to the uncertainty of the market’s response. These changes provide a 
number of testable hypothesis for this analysis. 
 The first expectation is that eligible firms would increase CSR expenditures more than 
non-eligible firms and more than eligible firms before 2015. While the literature review outlines 
many of the reasons why firms in developing countries may not have the same incentives to 
engage in CSR, there are a number of reasons why the Companies Act may increase firms’ CSR 
expenditures. Stakeholder presences, market uncertainty, and peer effects have already been 
discussed. Another motivating factor may be to avert further government regulation. While 
preempting government regulation is one of the reasons for strategic CSR in developed 
countries, the Indian government has now shown an interest in increasing CSR activities through 
law. Firms risk the government imposing a harsher penalty or stricter standards if they fail to 
comply with the Act. 
 The second hypothesis is that firms will increase their CSR expenditures as profits 
increase. The Companies Act mandates that companies spend 2% of their average net profits on 
CSR activities, therefore, to comply with the Act, firms with higher profits would engage in 
higher levels of CSR. Additionally, highly profitable firms with more resources at their disposal 
are in a better position to take part in CSR activities. These firms may also be at greater risk of 
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negative public perception or increased government regulation. Finally, firms with high profits 
are likely to be firmly eligible, meaning they are far from the thresholds for eligibility know they 
will be eligible every year. Firms eligible in both years will have more motivation to undertake 
the extensive planning and additional costs associated with developing and implementing a CSR 
policy. 
 A third hypothesis proposes that firms that have a CSR to profit ratio below the mandated 
2% will increase their CSR ratio by more than firms who have a ratio greater than 2%. The 
straightforward explanation is that firms with a CSR ratio less than 2% will increase their CSR 
spending in 2015 and 2016 to meet the Act’s requirements or keep up with their peers. 
Meanwhile, firms with a CSR ratio greater than 2% were spending their optimal level of CSR 
before the Act and may not be influenced in the same way by the Act. 
The fourth expectation is that firms will reshuffle non-CSR donations to activities that 
meet the criteria for CSR. If firms were spending their optimal level of CSR prior to the Act, 
then an alternative to increasing their charitable spending would be to rearrange these activities 
into ones that classify as CSR. This crowding out effect would be exhibited as decrease in non-
CSR donations in 2015 and 2016. Ostrom (2000) demonstrates that many policies adopted in 
modern democracies crowd-out cooperative behavior. Similarly, Frey & Jergen (2001) look at 
crowding-out effects of external interventions across various laboratory and field experiments 
and find “extrinsic motives may crowd out intrinsic motives”. In this analysis that would mean 
that the extrinsic motivation of complying with the Companies Act would crowd out the intrinsic 
strategic or altruistic motivations behind a company’s non-CSR donations. 
 The fifth hypothesis to be tested is that a firm’s peers have a positive impact on a firm’s 
CSR expenditures. That is to say that if a firm’s peers are spending more on CSR, the firm itself 
13 
 
is more likely to increase its own CSR. How does a firm determine who it considers its peers? 
For the purposes of CSR, this thesis considers peers as firms in the same industry as these firms 
are subject to the same shocks and public perceptions. 
 The final hypothesis for this analysis is that “mandatory” CSR has less of an impact on 
financial performance than purely voluntary CSR. If the results indicate a positive relationship 
between CSR and financial performance prior to the Company Act, the expectation is that 
relationship will weaken starting in 2015. It is unclear how the market will react to mandatory 
CSR. It may or may not reward compliance with the Act in that even mandatory CSR is still a 
charitable activity. The market may or may not punish firms which do not comply due to the 
public nature of non-compliance. The Indian government believes that forcing firms to post their 
reasons for non-compliance is enough of a motivating factor. The implementation of the 
Companies Act provides a unique situation compared to other literature in that has created a 
hybrid between voluntary and mandatory CSR. Its effect on financial performance is yet to be 
determined. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
A series of difference-in-difference regressions are estimated to compare various 
measures of social responsibility by eligible and non-eligible firms before and after the 
Companies Act was implemented. The first regression model is a linear probability model to 
examine whether the Act motivated a change in the likelihood of an eligible firm reporting its 
CSR. 
𝐶𝑆𝑅 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑡 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
2016
𝑡=2015
+  
𝜏𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
2016
𝑡=2015
+ 𝛽𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where CSR Dummyit takes a value of 1 if firm i reports CSR at year t even if it reports a CSR of 
Rs. 0; the value of the CSR Dummyit is 0 if the firm does not report a value for CSR at all. 
Eligibleit takes a value of 1 in year t if firm i meets the criteria set forth by the Companies Act 
outlined in the Background on the Companies Act Section. The variable Profitit is a rolling 
average of profits before tax (PBT) for the previous 3 years. Therefore, Profit is predetermined at 
time t and unlikely to have any reverse causality on CSR. The term 𝜇𝑖  are the time invariant, firm 
fixed effects to capture any unobserved firm specific characteristics. The variable Yeart is a 
dummy equal to 1 for each year from 2010 to 2016. The random error term is represented as 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
 The interaction term Eligibleit*Yeart, where t is 2015 or 2016, provides the difference-in-
difference estimate of eligibility on the dependent variable. The Eligible term differentiates 
between eligible and non-eligible firms after the Act, while the Year term distinguishes between 
eligible firms from before the Act to after. Together they represent the differential effect of 
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eligibility status after 2014. An additional interaction variable Profitit*Eligibleit*Yeart, for t equal 
to 2015 or 2016, provides the difference-in-difference estimate of profits and eligibility on the 
dependent variable. 
The coefficient α measures the average change in probability that an eligible firm i 
reports its CSR. This coefficient is not estimated for firms that maintain the same eligibility 
throughout the sample and therefore only measures the change in probability for firms that 
change eligibility at some point in the sample. The coefficient δ is the average treatment effect 
and measures the change in probability that a firm eligible in 2015 or 2016 report its CSR. The 
coefficient 𝜏 represents the average change in probability that a firm will report CSR based on its 
level of profits, while the coefficient 𝜑 measures that same change for firms that were eligible in 
2015 or 2016. Finally, 𝛽𝑡 captures the year fixed effects to capture the trend over time. 
The second regression model examines the effect of the Companies Act on the level of 
CSR expenditure of firms. The dependent variable is the level of CSR expenditure. 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
2016
𝑡=2015
+ 𝜏𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 
∑ 𝜑𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
2016
𝑡=2015
+ 𝛽𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
All explanatory variables are defined in the same manner as in Equation 1. The coefficient α 
measures the change in the level of CSR of an eligible firm. This coefficient is not estimated for 
firms that maintain the same eligibility throughout the sample and therefore only measures the 
change in probability for firms that change eligibility at some point in the sample. The 
coefficient δ measures the same change in the level of CSR for firms eligible in 2015 or 2016. 
The coefficient 𝜏 measures the change in the level of CSR based on its level of profits, while the 
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coefficient 𝜑 measures that same change for firms that were eligible in 2015 or 2016. Finally, 𝛽𝑡 
represents the year fixed effects to capture the trend over time. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. To test the parallel trends assumption, an alternate model is estimated with 
Eligible*Year interaction terms for every year. For the assumption to hold only the 2015 and 
2016 interactions should be statistically significant. The results of this regression are presented in 
Table 2, which confirms the parallel trends assumption as only interactions which are statistically 
significant occur after the Act went into effect. 
 The next method for examining a firm’s CSR expenditures centers on the idea that a 
firm’s spending on charitable activities may be influenced by the spending of its peers. The 
influence that similar firms may have on an individual firm is referred to as the peer effect. This 
effect is measured by including an additional explanatory variable of a firm’s peers’ average 
CSR expenditures.  
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑡 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
2016
𝑡=2015
+ 𝜏𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 
∑ 𝜑𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
2016
𝑡=2015
+ 𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜆𝐶𝑆𝑅(𝑟−𝑖)𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (3)  
Where CSRirt is the level of CSR for firm i, in year t, in peer group r. The other explanatory 
variables are defined in the same manner as in previous equations. The new variable, 𝐶𝑆𝑅(𝑟−𝑖)𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 
is the average CSR expenditure of firm i’s peer group r excluding firm i. Test statistics reported 
in the Results Section, reject the null hypothesis that 𝐶𝑆𝑅(𝑟−𝑖)𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is exogeneous to CSR in favor of 
treating the variable as endogenous. Therefore, an instrumental variable approach is used in 
which the variables Eligible and Eligible*Year of peer firms, excluding firm i, are used as IVs 
for peer group r’s average CSR (Leary and Roberts, 2014). The coefficients can be interpreted in 
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the same way as Equation 2 with the addition of the 𝜆 coefficient. This new coefficient measures 
the change in firm i’s CSR that can be attributed to the CSR of its peer group, r. Standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. 
 The third difference-in-difference model studies the effect of the Companies Act on the 
ratio of CSR to average profit of firms. This ratio mimics the 2% of average profits which 
eligible firms are required to spend under the Act. 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑡 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
2016
𝑡=2015
+ 𝛽𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
All explanatory variables are defined in the same manner as in previous equations. The 
coefficient α measures the percentage point change in CSR to profit ratio that an eligible firm 
makes in any year. This coefficient is not estimated for firms that maintain the same eligibility 
throughout the sample and therefore only measures the change in probability for firms that 
change eligibility at some point in the sample. The coefficient δ measures the same change in the 
ratio for firms eligible in 2015 or 2016. One notable difference in this regression is that since 
average profits were used in calculating the dependent variable it is not included as any of the 
covariates. The coefficient, 𝛽𝑡 captures the year fixed effects to capture the trend over time. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
The fifth regression model examines the effect of the Companies Act on the level of non-
CSR donations of firms. 
𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑡 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
2016
𝑡=2015
+ 𝜏𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 
+ ∑ 𝜑𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
2016
𝑡=2015
+ 𝛽𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
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All explanatory variables are defined in the same manner as in previous equations. The 
coefficient α measures the change in the level of donations of an eligible firm in any year. This 
coefficient is not estimated for firms that maintain the same eligibility throughout the sample and 
therefore only measures the change in probability for firms that change eligibility at some point 
in the sample. The coefficient δ measures the same change in the level of donations for firms 
eligible in 2015 or 2016. The coefficient 𝜏 measures the change in the level of donations based 
on its level of profits, while the coefficient 𝜑 measures that same change for firms that were 
eligible in 2015 or 2016. The coefficient, 𝛽𝑡 captures the year fixed effects to capture the trend 
over time. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
 The final model estimated in this analysis centers around finding the effects of CSR 
spending on different measures of firm value. To measure the effect of CSR spending on firm 
value, the CSR spending must lag a year behind to capture the reaction to CSR spending. 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑗  𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2015 + 𝛽𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (6) 
The two variables used to measure financial performance are ROA and Tobin’s q. The variable 
CSRi,t-1 is the level of CSR lagged by one year. The interaction variable CSRi,t-1*Year2015 captures 
how the impact of CSR on the dependent variable changed after the Act was implemented. The 
coefficient α measures the change in the level of a financial variable of an eligible firm in any 
year, while the coefficient δ measures the same change in the level of a financial variable for 
firms eligible in 2015. The year is restricted to 2015 in order to look at the differential effect of 
CSR on firm value after the Companies Act.  The coefficient, 𝛽𝑡 captures the year fixed effects 
to capture the trend over time. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
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CHAPTER 5: DATA AND VARIABLE DEFINTIONS 
 The data for this analysis is obtained from the Prowess database compiled by the Centre 
for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). It contains annual report and quarterly financial 
statement data on over 45,000 publicly listed and unlisted companies, as well as private limited 
and unregistered companies. The sample for this thesis is restricted to observations from 2010 to 
2016 that report data on at least one of the variables: sales, net worth, or net profit since those are 
the criteria the Companies Act uses to determine eligibility. The sample consists of 39,736 
unique firms for the period 2010-2016. Since data is not reported for all firms in every year, an 
unbalanced panel dataset is constructed with 165,971 total observations across the 7 years. 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
The Eligible variable takes a value of 1 in a given year if the firm meets the criteria 
defined by Section 135 of the Companies Act, i.e. a net worth of at least Rs. 5 billion, a net profit 
of at least Rs. 50 million, or sales greater than Rs. 10 billion in any of the previous 3 years1. For 
some companies, eligibility varied over time. In order to examine the effect of the Act on CSR 
expenses of companies in each of the two years, I define eligibility in several ways. I distinguish 
between firms that were eligible in 2015 and those eligible in 2016. I also analyze the impact of 
the Act on firms that were eligible in both years. 
The calculation of net profit is specified in Section 198 of the Companies Act, which is 
primarily net profits before tax. PBT is calculated in Prowess by adding a firm’s reported after 
tax profits to its direct tax provisions. The ProwessIQ database dictionary (2017) describes PBT 
as “the most comparable measure of proﬁts when it comes to comparing various companies or 
even industries.” Sales is explained as the main revenue of a firm from all goods and non-
                                                 
1 A FAQ article on the Government of India’s Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) clarifies that “any financial 
year” refers to any of the three preceding financial years. 
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financial services. Net worth is defined as “the monies put into the company by the equity 
shareholders in the form of equity capital and the proﬁts generated and retained as reserves by 
the company.” 
While yearly PBT is used for defining eligibility, the expected 2% of CSR is determined 
by the average PBT for the three preceding years. This is variable is referred to as Profit 
throughout this analysis and is calculated as a rolling average of the past 3 years of PBT. If a 
firm is missing PBT for one (or more) of the three years, that year is omitted from the calculation 
and the rolling average is created using the previous two (or one) years.  
CSR is proxied by the variable “social and community expenses” provided in the Prowess 
dataset for the period 2010-2014 and defined as “expenses incurred by companies for beneﬁt of 
the society or community in general.” In 2015 and 2016, Prowess introduces a variable for the 
“amount spent on CSR activities during the year,” which is defined in the same way as “social 
and community expenses”. Therefore, the CSR variable takes the value of social and community 
expenses before 2015 and the CSR variable in 2015 and 2016. While the two variables overlap, 
Prowess’ CSR variable excludes non-CSR compliant activities that may be present in the “social 
and community expenses” in 2015 and 2016. If the firm was missing either of these variables 
their expenditures were treated as 0. A firm’s CSR is divided by Profit to create CSR Ratio. The 
Donations variable is a measure of a firm’s other charitable activity outside of CSR. These 
donations may be spent on religious or political donations, whereas CSR cannot be spent on 
those domains. 
There are two variables used to assess the impact of the Companies Act on financial 
performance: Tobin’s Q and ROA. Tobin’s Q is a ratio of the market value of a company’s assets 
to the replacement cost or book value of those assets. A Tobin’s q of exactly 1, indicates that a 
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firm’s market value perfectly represents the replacement cost of its assets. ROA can be defined 
as the ratio of a firm’s net income divided by its average total assets. While Prowess’ ROA was 
poorly reported, ROA was calculated for this paper by dividing profit before depreciation, 
interest, taxes, or amortization (PBDITA) by the book value of its assets. 
For this analysis peers are firms in the same industry group. The industry groups are 
determined using the 5-digit National Industrial Classification (NIC) code. The NIC codes 
disaggregate firms into 21 industry sectors based on the nature of their economic activities. I 
group the 12 smallest sectors together into an “Other” category: Real Estate, Water and Waste 
Management, Public Administration & Defense, Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation, Other 
Service Activities, Education, Human Health & Social Work, Agriculture, Accommodation and 
Food Service, Administrative & Support Services, and Professional, Scientific, & Technical. 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Figure 1 shows the number of eligible and non-eligible firms by year. The number of 
firms generally decreases from 2010 to 2015. In 2015, 6,237 (28.8%) of 21,637 firms in the 
sample that year were eligible. In 2016, the total number of eligible firms was 5,448 (30.5%) out 
of 17,839 firms. Table 1 displays the summary statistics of the relevant variables in this analysis. 
All monetary units in this paper are presented in Rs. million unless specified otherwise. The 
eligible firms have a much greater PBT, sales, and net worth than the non-eligible firms. 
Furthermore, the averages in those variables greatly exceed the thresholds for eligibility. Based 
on this, the cutoff for PBT, Rs. 50 million, is the most restrictive of the qualifying variables. The 
average non-eligible firm suffers a net loss, which corresponds with lower levels of CSR and 
donations. An average firm in the sample has a PBT of Rs. 272 million and spends Rs. 1.52 
million (0.56% of their PBT) on CSR. Table 1 also shows the number of reported observations of 
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the qualifying variables. While only two-thirds of the firms have reported information on sales, 
the other variables are more widely available. 
Figure 2 displays the percentage of eligible and non-eligible firms with reported CSR by 
year. There is a fairly linear increase in CSR Dummy of eligible firms reporting CSR from 2014 
to 2016. Some firms may have started reporting their CSR in 2014 in anticipation of the Act in 
2015. Meanwhile, there is only a slight increase of eligible firms which are spending a positive 
amount on CSR in 2014. The sharp jump in positive CSR expenditures of eligible firms occurs 
after the Act went into effect. In 2015 and 2016 almost all the eligible firms reporting CSR were 
reporting a CSR greater than 0. 
Figure 3 presents the average charitable spending of eligible and non-eligible firms by 
year. Eligible firms have a sharp increase in average CSR expenditures in 2015 & 2016, while 
maintaining steady average donation figures. Meanwhile, the non-eligible firms exhibit 
extremely low levels of both CSR and non-CSR donations throughout the sample. The summary 
statistics indicate no evidence that firms are reorganizing their charitable activities between 
donations and CSR in response to the Act. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of CSR Ratio up to 4%. These plots highlight two key 
findings. First, there is a spike at the 2% ratio in eligible firms in 2015 and 2016. This is the 
expectation if firms were complying with the Act. Second, these peaks represent a relatively 
small percentage of the overall eligible firms, which shows that many eligible firms are still short 
of their required spending.  
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS 
Table 3 presents the results on the effect of the Companies Act on the reporting of CSR 
expenses by firms. I estimate various specifications, that differ in the covariates included. All 
models include clustered standard errors at the firm level and year and firm fixed effects. In 
Model 1, I include Eligible and Eligible*Year as covariates. The interaction terms measure the 
differential effect of eligibility after the Act went into effect. Model 2 also introduces Profit as a 
covariate, while Model 3 also includes the Profit*Eligible*Year interactions. 
All three models provide robust evidence that eligible firms were more likely to report 
CSR in 2015 and 2016 relative to eligible firms before the act and ineligible firms after. Every 
model has a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the Eligible variable, which 
suggests that eligible firms whose eligibility changes during the sample were less likely to report 
their CSR prior to the Companies Act. These models have positive and statistically significant 
coefficients on the Eligible*Year terms, which show the probability of eligible firms reporting 
their CSR increased by about 27 percentage points in 2015 and about 43 percentage points in 
2016. Furthermore, the positive and statistically significant coefficient on Profit displays that 
firms were more likely to report their CSR the higher their profits. According to Model 2, Rs. 10 
billion increase in Profit increases the probability of reporting CSR by 5.72 percentage points. 
The Profit*Eligible*Year interactions show that the Companies Act has little to no impact on the 
likelihood of CSR reporting at higher profits, while the Profit term remains similar in 
significance and magnitude. 
 Table 4 shows the results on the effect of the Companies Act on the level of CSR 
expenditures using Equation 2. All models include firm-level clustered standard errors and year 
and firm fixed effects. Model 1 uses the Eligible and Eligible*Year variables. The interaction 
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terms measure the differential effect of eligibility after the Act went into effect. Model 2 
introduces Profit as a covariate, while Model 3 includes interaction terms Profit*Eligible*Year. 
These new interaction terms quantify the effect higher profits have on CSR spending for eligible 
firms in particular. 
 These models reinforce the idea that the Act had a statistically significant positive impact 
on CSR spending. Two of the three models have negative and statistically significant coefficients 
on Eligible, which indicates that eligible firms which changed eligibility before the Act went into 
effect were spending less on CSR. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the 
Profit term in Model 2 suggests that even before the Act went into effect firms were increasing 
their CSR expenditures as profits increased. For Model 2, the level at which higher profits would 
overtake a negative Eligible coefficient can be calculated by dividing negative Eligible 
coefficient by its Profit coefficient. This turning point for Equation 6 is 4.694/0.0108 which 
equals Rs. 435 million. Therefore, the positive effects of Profit overtake the negative effect of 
pre-Act eligibility at Rs. 435 million. 
Model 1 shows that eligible firms increased their CSR spending by Rs. 10.4 million in 
2015 and by Rs. 16.23 million in 2016 relative to non-eligible firms in those years. Other models 
in Table 4 provide robust evidence that eligible firms in 2016 were increasing their CSR 
expenditures by more than in 2015. Eligible firms with higher profits also increased their CSR 
spending by more than their less profitable counterparts as exhibited by the positive and 
statistically significant coefficients on the Profit*Eligible*Year terms. These coefficients on the 
Profit terms relate back to the Companies Act in a very convincing manner. Model 3 shows that 
an increase of Rs. 100 million Profit corresponded to Rs. 1.08 million increase in CSR in 2015 
and Rs. 0.942 million in 2016. 
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 In Table 5, I present the results from the regressions that examine the effects of peer 
pressure on a firm’s expenditures on CSR. All models include year and firm fixed effects and 
clustered standard errors at the firm level. The purpose of these regressions is to determine the 
effect that a firm’s peers has on its CSR spending. The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis 
that peer averaged CSR expenditure is exogenous with a p-value of 0.000 in favor of treating 
peer averaged CSR as endogenous. In Model 1 the variables Eligible and Eligible*Year of peer 
firms, excluding firm i, are used as IVs for peer group r’s average CSR. Model 1 also includes 
the variables Eligible and Eligible*Year, as explanatory variables. Model 2 has the same 
instruments for peer CSR but includes Profit as a covariate. Model 3 introduces the firm’s 
Profit*Eligible*Year variable as covariates while using the same set of instruments as in Model 
2.  
For the IV models three test statistics are included for each regression. The Kleibergen-
Paap rk LM statistic indicates the significance level of the underidentification test. If the Chi-sq 
p-value is less than 0.05 reject the null hypothesis the equation is under identified in favor of an 
identified model. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F Statistic is a test for the weak identification of 
instrumental variables. Compare to the Stock-Yogo weak test critical value for the number of 
instruments and endogenous regressors in an equation. If the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F Statistic 
is greater than the corresponding Stock-Yogo weak test critical value reject the null hypothesis 
that the instruments are weak in favor of strong instruments. The provided Stock-Yogo weak test 
critical values are at the 0.1 confidence level, when there are no Stock-Yogo weak test critical 
values for that configuration it is indicated by an -. The Sargan Hansen test statistic for over-
identification is included as well since there are more instruments than terms instrumented for. If 
the Chi-sq p-value is less than 0.05 then the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid must 
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be rejected in favor of the instrumental variables being over-identified. The test statistics for all 
three models indicate an identified model with strong instruments. Model 3 fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that the model is over-identified. 
The peer effect models add new context to the previous discussion on CSR expenditures. 
These regressions suggest that impact of eligibility alone may have been overstated when peer 
effects were not included. Only Models 1 and 2 shows a statistically significant coefficient on 
Eligible and Eligible*Year, and even then, the coefficients are smaller in magnitude than the 
models without peer effects. The effect of eligibility in 2015 and 2016 corresponds to an increase 
in CSR of Rs. 10.02 million in 2015 and Rs. 15.61 million in 2016. The peer effect models also 
corroborate the trend of firms increasing their CSR with increasing profits.  
The positive and statistically significant peer effect coefficients show strong peer effects. 
The models demonstrate that Rs. 1 million increase in their peers’ CSR expenditure corresponds 
to Rs. 0.495 million increase in the firm’s CSR expenditure in Model 1 and an increase of Rs. 
0.769 million in Model 2. These peer effects provide valuable insight into explaining why firms 
are increasing their CSR expenditures. While the Companies Act encourages some firms to 
increase their CSR expenditures, other firms are more motivated by the CSR of their peers. 
Figure 5 displays a plot of the coefficients of the determinants of CSR Model 3 & the 
Peer Effect Model 3. The plot of estimated coefficients shows the rate at which firms increased 
CSR as Profit increased. These trend lines show how CSR expenditures for eligible firms in 2016 
have increased compared to eligible firms in 2015. Overall the non-peer effects model predicts a 
large number of firms meeting or exceeding the 2% benchmark in 2016, while only 18.6% of 
firms met that mark in 2016. The peer effects model corrects for some of this overestimation 
with lower values of CSR across all profits. This suggests a much smaller percentage of firms 
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complying with the Companies Act in 2016. Both the models underpredict eligible firm’s CSR in 
2015 with firms failing to reach the 2% across the range of Profit. 
In Table 6, I present the results from the regression that examines the effect of the 
Companies Act on the CSR to average profit ratio. All models have year and firm fixed effects 
and standard errors clustered at the firm level. The explanatory variables in both models are 
Eligible and Eligible*Year. Since Profit is incorporated in the outcome variable it cannot be 
included as an explanatory variable. Model 1 is estimated for the firms with a CSR to profit ratio 
greater than or equal to 2%, while Model 1 is estimated for the firms with a ratio less than 2%. 
The firms in Model 1 were already spending a higher percentage of their profits on CSR 
than the Act would have prescribed, and these models suggest the Act did not have a noticeable 
impact on their ratio. There were no statistically significant coefficients in Model 1. A positive 
and statistically significant Eligible*Year term in Model 2 suggest these firms did increase their 
ratios by about 1.11 percentage points in 2016 which would be an appropriate magnitude 
assuming firms wanted to reach the mandated 2%. While the Eligible*Year coefficient for 2015 
is not statistically significant it is similar in magnitude; it predicts a 1.35 percentage point 
increase in CSR Ratio for eligible firms in 2015. A statistically significant finding in 2016 and 
not 2015 strengthens the argument that firms responded more to the Act as time went on. 
Table 7 presents the results for the effect of the Companies Act on the level of non-CSR 
donations. All models include year and firm fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. The explanatory variables in Model 1 include Eligible and Eligible*Year terms. 
Model 2 includes Profit as a covariate, while Model 3 includes the Profit*Eligible*Year terms as 
well. 
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The regressions in Table 9 show no evidence of a hypothesized crowding out effect. 
Although none of the coefficients meet statistical significance, the signs of the coefficients 
suggest that firms treat Donations similarly to CSR. Positive coeffects on the Eligible*Year terms 
indicate that eligible firms were increasing their Donations more after the Companies Act. This 
would provide evidence against any crowding out effect and might suggest some spillover across 
charitable activities. Also similar to the CSR regressions is the increase of Donations with 
increasing Profit. After the Act this effect is almost entirely transferred to eligible firms. The 
additional expenditures on CSR after the Act appear to be new spending, not a reorganization of 
non-CSR donations. 
IMPACT OF THE COMPANIES ACT ON CSR AND DONATIONS 
 Another way to judge the overall impact of the Companies Act is to use the regression 
models to predict values for CSR and Donations in each year for eligible and non-eligible firms. 
Figure 6 shows the predicted values for CSR from peer effect Model 3. This model shows 
eligible firms with higher values of CSR throughout the sample on a parallel trend with the non-
eligible firms. After the Companies Act the predicted values for eligible firms increases year-
over-year from 2015 to 2016. Figure 7 displays the predicted values for Donations from Model 3 
on the same scale as the previous CSR plot. Again, the non-eligible firms are predicted to have 
lower expenditures on non-CSR donations on fairly parallel trends. However, this pattern does 
not change after the Companies Act, which confirms that there is no evidence of any crowding 
out from CSR expenditures. 
EFFECTS OF CSR ON FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
 In Table 8 I display the results on the impact of CSR spending on a firm’s financial 
performance using Equation 6. All models include year and firm fixed effects and clustered 
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standard errors at the firm level. Models 1 and 3 use Tobin’s q as the outcome variable to 
measure financial performance, while Models 2 and 4 use ROA. Models 1 and 2 use just the 
lagged value of CSR as a covariate, while the remaining two models also interact the lagged 
value of CSR with 2015 to show the impact after the Companies Act went into effect. 
 All four models suggest that CSR spending did not have a statistically significant impact 
on either measure of firm valuation. The interaction between prior year CSR and the 2015 year 
dummy also shows that there is no proof that the impact of CSR spending changed after the Act 
went into effect. Nevertheless, the sign on the coefficients in Model 3 suggest that CSR was 
having a positive impact on Tobin’s q prior to the Companies Act, but that sign reverses in 2015. 
The ROA model demonstrates mixed results in this regard. This may indicate that the type of 
benefits that firms receive from CSR may have been altered though the Company Act.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 After decades of extensive research on CSR the Companies Act of 2013 finally provided 
a natural experiment to analyze the decisions that firms make toward charitable spending. Firms 
either met the criteria laid out by the Act and were deemed “eligible” or were labeled “non-
eligible.” This provided two approaches to comparing these groups. First, firms that were eligible 
before the Act could be compared to eligible firms after the Act went into effect to estimate the 
impact of the law over time. Second, after the law went into effect, eligible firms could be 
compared to non-eligible firms to evaluate the impact of eligibility alone. However, without a 
penalty for non-compliance it remained to be seen if firms would undertake their prescribed 
amount of CSR expenditures. 
 Through a series of difference-in-difference regressions, this research has shown that the 
Companies Act has had a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of eligible 
firms reporting their CSR, the magnitude of their CSR expenditures, and their CSR to profit 
ratio. Additional evidence suggests that these effects become stronger on firms with increasing 
profits. The results also demonstrate the large impact of peer effects on a firm’s CSR 
expenditures. For every Rs. million that a firm’s peers increase their CSR expenditures that firm 
is expected to increase its CSR expenditures by between Rs. 0.495 and Rs. 0769 million. While 
the regressions modeling CSR expenditure tend to overestimate the number of firms who are 
complying with the Companies Act, peer effects models help bring these estimations closer to 
reality. While the Companies Act encouraged some firms to increase their CSR expenditures, it 
may have been the peer effects from those firms which motivated their peers to increase their 
CSR in turn. 
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 This paper also demonstrated little evidence of any crowding out effect of the Companies 
Act on non-CSR donations. The difference-in-difference estimations showed insignificant results 
on the magnitude of non-CSR donations. The signs of the regression coefficients suggest that 
non-CSR donations are being treated similarly to CSR donations as they may be increasing with 
the Companies Act and with increasing profits. 
 Finally, this analysis adds to the growing literature on the relationship between CSR and 
financial performance. While profit maximizing firms would only be expected to engage in CSR 
if there was a financial benefit to charitable expenses there are other unique factors at work here. 
Past research has shown that the effects of strategic CSR are weaker in developing countries. 
This impact may be even more diminished due to the expectations surrounding the Companies 
Act as “mandatory” charity. The results in this paper reveal that there were no financial benefits 
for firms to engage in CSR in this market. There is no evidence of any relationship between CSR 
and financial performance either before or after the Act. Mandating that firms must engage in 
CSR activity may be the best course of action until a culture of social responsibility is more 
developed or future research can provide stronger evidence of the benefits to firms. 
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Figure 2: Percentage of Firms Reporting CSR by Year 
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Figure 3: Average Charitable Expenditures by Eligibility and Year 
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Figure 4: Ratio of CSR to Average Profit for Eligible Firms from 2014-2016 
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Figure 5: Net effect of Profits on CSR by Eligible Firms with and without Peer Effects 
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Figure 6: Predicted Values of CSR Using Peer Effect Model 3 
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Figure 7: Predicted Values of Donations Using Model 3 in Table 9 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics  
Non-Eligible Firms Eligible Firms Total 
Units:  Rs. Millions Mean # of Obs Mean # of Obs Mean # of Obs 
Firms 
 
125,685  
 
40,286  
 
165,971  
PBT -16 111,495  1,072  40,191  272 151,686  
Sales 606 73,511  13,635  35,465  4,846  108,976  
Net Worth 153 125,679  8,532  40,286  2,187  165,965  
CSR 0.0182 125,685  6.19 40,286  1.52 165,971  
Donations 0.0562 125,685  3.68 40,286  0.937 165,971  
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Table 2: Determinants of CSR to Test Parallel Trends  
Model 1 
VARIABLES CSR Level 
Eligible -5.230***  
(1.458) 
Eligible*2011 -0.639  
(0.769) 
Eligible*2012 -0.971  
(1.234) 
Eligible*2013 1.047  
(1.310) 
Eligible*2014 2.669  
(1.393) 
Eligible*2015 11.16***  
(2.710) 
Eligible*2016 16.95***  
(2.654) 
2011.Year 0.0656***  
(0.0149) 
2012.Year 0.180***  
(0.0313) 
2013.Year 0.199***  
(0.0334) 
2014.Year 0.172***  
(0.0345) 
2015.Year 0.0214  
(0.0325) 
2016.Year -0.102**  
(0.0388) 
Constant 1.636***  
(0.0514) 
Observations 165,971 
Number of Firms 39,736 
Firm FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Linear Probability Model, Determinants of CSR Dummy  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES CSR Dummy CSR Dummy CSR Dummy 
Eligible -0.0190*** -0.0278*** -0.0274***  
(0.00317) (0.00358) (0.00357) 
Eligible*2015 0.271*** 0.271*** 0.269***  
(0.00624) (0.00634) (0.00634) 
Eligible*2016 0.426*** 0.427*** 0.427***  
(0.00683) (0.00693) (0.00698) 
Profit 
 
0.00000572*** 0.00000496***   
(0.00000112) (0.00000138) 
Profit*Eligible*2015 
  
0.00000169*    
(0.000000721) 
Profit*Eligible*2016 
  
-0.0000000507    
(0.000000892) 
2011.Year 0.00358*** 0.00376*** 0.00377***  
(0.000562) (0.000669) (0.000669) 
2012.Year 0.00779*** 0.00891*** 0.00893***  
(0.000734) (0.000844) (0.000843) 
2013.Year 0.0124*** 0.0140*** 0.0140***  
(0.000863) (0.00102) (0.00102) 
2014.Year 0.0603*** 0.0686*** 0.0686***  
(0.00178) (0.00207) (0.00207) 
2015.Year 0.0209*** 0.0232*** 0.0232***  
(0.00106) (0.00125) (0.00125) 
2016.Year 0.0208*** 0.0233*** 0.0233***  
(0.00109) (0.00131) (0.00131) 
Constant 0.00783*** 0.00988*** 0.00998***  
(0.000947) (0.00130) (0.00131) 
Observations 165,971 140,206 140,206 
Number of Firms 39,736 36,158 36,158 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Determinants of Level of CSR Expenditures  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES CSR Level CSR Level CSR Level 
Eligible -4.634*** -4.694*** 0.306  
(0.818) (0.713) (1.149) 
Eligible*2015 10.40*** 8.689*** -2.656  
(2.112) (1.606) (2.526) 
Eligible*2016 16.23*** 13.47*** 2.693  
(2.250) (1.572) (3.235) 
Profit 
 
0.0108*** -0.000171   
(0.00284) (0.00253) 
Profit*Eligible*2015 
  
0.0108***    
(0.00299) 
Profit*Eligible*2016 
  
0.00942**    
(0.00352) 
2011.Year -0.0690 -0.393 -0.205  
(0.156) (0.206) (0.189) 
2012.Year -0.0318 -0.744* -0.416  
(0.270) (0.357) (0.306) 
2013.Year 0.482 -0.252 -0.0394  
(0.313) (0.427) (0.337) 
2014.Year 0.932** 0.127 0.316  
(0.347) (0.453) (0.333) 
2015.Year 0.274 -0.134 0.0228  
(0.220) (0.301) (0.243) 
2016.Year 0.143 -0.168 -0.0185  
(0.215) (0.295) (0.244) 
Constant 1.479*** -0.501 0.866  
(0.181) (0.638) (0.477) 
Observations 165,971 140,206 140,206 
Number of Firms 39,736 36,158 36,158 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Determinants of Level of CSR Expenditures with Peer Effects  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES CSR Level CSR Level CSR Level 
Peer CSR 0.495* 0.769** 0.596**  
(0.233) (0.282) (0.218) 
Eligible -4.530*** -4.514*** 0.440  
(0.788) (0.666) (1.164) 
Eligible*2015 10.02*** 8.102*** -3.116  
(1.995) (1.453) (2.560) 
Eligible*2016 15.61*** 12.50*** 1.969  
(2.108) (1.447) (3.329) 
Profit 
 
0.0108*** -0.000167   
(0.00284) (0.00254) 
Profit*Eligible*2015 
  
0.0108***    
(0.00299) 
Profit*Eligible*2016 
  
0.00940**    
(0.00353) 
2011.Year 0.00350 -0.266 -0.106  
(0.164) (0.204) (0.199) 
2012.Year 0.105 -0.511 -0.236  
(0.293) (0.361) (0.337) 
2013.Year 0.465 -0.245 -0.0341  
(0.309) (0.425) (0.336) 
2014.Year 0.766* -0.105 0.136  
(0.318) (0.460) (0.313) 
2015.Year -0.945 -2.004** -1.425**  
(0.543) (0.744) (0.487) 
2016.Year -1.961* -3.405** -2.525**  
(0.951) (1.204) (0.845) 
Constant 1.116*** -1.086 0.411  
(0.271) (0.807) (0.527) 
Observations 165,971 140,206 140,206 
Number of Firms 39,736 36,158 36,158 
Kleibergen-Paap rk 
 LM statistic  
(Chi-sq p-value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Kleibergen-Paap rk 
 Wald F statistic 
 (Stock-Yogo weak 
 test critical value) 
4116.443 (22.30) 3505.550 (22.30) 3504.822 (22.30) 
Sargan-Hansen statistic 
 (Chi-sq p-value) 
0.9494 0.5706 0.0199 
Instrumental Variables Peer Eligible & 
 Eligible*Year 
Peer Eligible & 
 Eligible*Year 
Peer Eligible & 
 Eligible*Year 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 6: Determinants of CSR to Average Profit Ratio  
Model 1 Model 2 
VARIABLES CSR Ratio > 2% CSR Ratio < 2% 
Eligible 0.630 -0.00106  
(1.555) (0.00191) 
Eligible*2015 -0.521 0.0135  
(1.100) (0.00755) 
Eligible*2016 -0.605 0.0111*  
(1.109) (0.00484) 
2011.Year -0.0110 0.000677  
(0.0943) (0.000616) 
2012.Year 0.522 -0.00162  
(0.561) (0.00248) 
2013.Year 0.258 0.00103  
(0.355) (0.00251) 
2014.Year 0.198 -0.00479  
(0.325) (0.00251) 
2015.Year 0.621 -0.00938  
(1.291) (0.00740) 
2016.Year 0.698 -0.00260  
(1.292) (0.00250) 
Constant -0.138 -0.00151  
(1.579) (0.000938) 
Observations 2,088 133,687 
Number of Firms 1,472 34,993 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Determinants of Level of Donations  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES Donations Donations Donations 
Eligible -0.0122 -0.114 1.209  
(0.438) (0.425) (0.675) 
Eligible*2015 0.884 0.418 -2.401  
(1.045) (0.687) (2.004) 
Eligible*2016 0.895 0.136 -2.892  
(1.150) (0.733) (1.839) 
Profit 
 
0.00267 -0.000247   
(0.00226) (0.000664) 
Profit*Eligible*2015 
  
0.00269    
(0.00239) 
Profit*Eligible*2016 
  
0.00263    
(0.00188) 
2011.Year 0.191 0.171 0.221  
(0.110) (0.135) (0.132) 
2012.Year 0.156 0.0410 0.129  
(0.132) (0.0715) (0.105) 
2013.Year 0.192 0.0447 0.102  
(0.162) (0.0900) (0.101) 
2014.Year 0.526 0.371 0.422  
(0.312) (0.192) (0.230) 
2015.Year 0.305* 0.241* 0.281*  
(0.149) (0.103) (0.133) 
2016.Year 0.287* 0.257* 0.298*  
(0.140) (0.116) (0.144) 
Constant 0.648*** 0.220 0.583  
(0.104) (0.586) (0.315) 
Observations 165,971 140,206 140,206 
Number of Firms 39,736 36,158 36,158 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Effect of CSR on Financial Performance  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VARIABLE Tobin’s Q ROA Tobin’s Q ROA 
Prior Year CSR 0.0754 -0.0605 0.0789 -0.0717  
(0.0883) (0.453) (0.0909) (0.465) 
Prior Year CSR*2015 
  
-0.0762 0.245    
(0.0581) (0.483) 
2011.Year -5.341 48.26 -5.342 48.26  
(4.748) (26.16) (4.749) (26.16) 
2012.Year -5.220 90.95* -5.228 90.98*  
(4.462) (38.44) (4.465) (38.45) 
2013.Year -5.122 60.30 -5.122 60.30  
(4.140) (51.18) (4.140) (51.18) 
2014.Year -1.731 108.6* -1.727 108.6*  
(3.133) (51.51) (3.132) (51.51) 
2015.Year 32.58 168.1** 32.85 167.2**  
(28.53) (63.35) (28.66) (63.25) 
2016.Year 31.29 313.5* 31.24 313.7*  
(25.37) (139.3) (25.34) (139.2) 
Constant 5.993 207.5*** 5.990 207.5***  
(4.033) (40.98) (4.035) (40.98) 
Observations 33,511 32,853 33,511 32,853 
Number of Firms 8,395 8,260 8,395 8,260 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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